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LANDOWNER LIABILITY IN MONTANA
Randall G. Nelson
I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent should landowners' be liable for injuries suf-
fered by those who enter upon their land? Historically, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court answered this question by focusing on three
entrant categories-invitee, licensee, and trespasser. Landowner li-
ability under these entrant categories represented an exception to
the fundamental rule that a tortfeasor is liable for injuries caused
by a failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
While an invitee is owed a duty of reasonable care, the common
law entrant categories allowed landowners to exercise a lesser stan-
dard of care toward those who entered their property as licensees
or trespassers.
In 1981, the Montana Supreme Court appeared to abandon
the entrant categories and apply a single standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances. In Corrigan v. Janney,2 the court
held that a landowner owes a duty of ordinary care in the manage-
ment of property to avoid exposing entrants to an unreasonable
risk of harm.' Although Corrigan suggested a departure from the
entrant categories, a subsequent 1981 decision disregarded Corri-
gan and continued to focus on entrant categories.4 The conflicting
decisions caused Montana attorneys and trial court judges to wres-
tle with the unsettled question of what standard of care is imposed
upon landowners.
On September 26, 1985, the Montana Supreme Court clarified
its position on the issue of landowner liability. In Limberhand v.
Big Ditch Co.,5 the court reaffirmed its commitment to the single
standard of care propounded in Corrigan.' Writing for a unani-
mous court, Justice Sheehy noted that the court erred in a decision
which contradicted Corrigan.7 After four years of uncertainty,
Limberhand is a welcome clarification of Montana's landowner lia-
1. For purposes of brevity in this comment, the term landowner will refer to all pos-
sessors and owners of land subject to liability to those who enter the landowner's premises.
2. - Mont. -, 626 P.2d 838 (1981).
3. Id. at -, 626 P.2d at 841.
4. Cereck v. Albertson's, Inc., 195 Mont. 409, 637 P.2d 509 (1981) (held that "In Mon-
tana, the duty imposed upon the property owner depends on the status of the injured
party."), Id. at 412, 637 P.2d at 511.
5. - Mont. -, 706 P.2d 491 (1985).
6. Id. at -, 706 P.2d at 496.
7. Id.
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bility law.
This comment briefly examines the traditional rules governing
landowner liability, and examines the Montana case law which cre-
ated confusion in this area. Finally, this comment examines the
single standard and its future application in Montana courts.
II. JUDICIAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Rules and Rationale
The common law rules governing landowner liability provide
three classifications-invitee, licensee, and trespasser-which de-
termine the duty of care owed by a landowner." An invitee is de-
fined as one who enters upon public land for its intended use, or
one who enters the landowner's premises for the economic benefit
of the landowner.9 A landowner owes an invitee a duty of ordinary
care. Traditionally, the rationale for the invitee rule argues that
because the landowner derives economic benefit from the invitee's
presence, the landowner should provide reasonably safe premises,
or warn of hidden dangers.10
A licensee, typically a social guest, has the landowner's per-
mission to use the premises, yet enters the premises for pleasure
without yielding economic benefit to the landowner."
[The licensee] receives the use of the premises as a gift, and
comes well within the old saying that one may not look a gift
horse in the mouth. He has no right to demand that the land be
made safe for his reception, and he must in general assume the
risk of whatever he may encounter, and look out for himself. The
rendering of permission to enter carries with it no obligation to
inspect the premises to discover dangers which are unknown to
the possessor, nor, a fortiori, to give warning or protection against
conditions which are known or should be obvious to the licensee.'"
Thus, under the common law rules, the landowner owes a licensee
a duty merely to avoid willful, wanton or intentional conduct.
13
The same duty that is owed to a licensee is also owed to a tres-
8. See generally 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 58 (1964); 65 C.J.S. Negligence §
63 (1955).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
10. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 61, p. 420 (5th ed.
1984).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965).
12. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, at § 60, p. 412.
13. See, e.g., 38 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 178 (1964);Harmon v. Billings Bench Water
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passer.' 4 The rationale provided as the basis for the trespasser rule
is that one who enters upon the landowner's premises without the
landowner's knowledge or permission cannot expect the landowner
to provide him with safe premises.' 5
B. History
The legal standards governing landowner liability reveal two
competing social values: "(1) the sanctity of landed property;16 (2)
the protection of members of the community from physical injury
caused by another's negligence.' 7 Historically, the sanctity of
landed property has commanded far more significance than protec-
tion of the community, partly because the common law entrant
categories that focus upon the status of the injured party trace
their ancestry to the feudal system of medieval Europe. Landown-
ers were a privileged class in the medieval era; the rules that gov-
erned their liability leaned heavily in their favor. Originally, a
landowner enjoyed complete immunity from liability for injury to
those entering upon his property. A landowner was "sovereign
within his own boundaries and as such might do what he pleased
on or with his own domain."'" These feudal landowner rules served
as a framework for the developing English common law.'9 English
and early American ideals perpetuated "this sanctity of land own-
ership [which] included notions of its economic importance and
the social desirability of the free use and exploitation of land."20
14. This rule does not apply in all jurisdictions, however. Some jurisdictions have
adopted § 342 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS which provides that a landowner has
a duty to warn the licensee of conditions which present an unreasonable risk of harm. Also,
for a definition of trespasser, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965).
15. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, at § 58, p. 393.
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 790 (5th ed. 1979), defines landed property as: "a collo-
quial or popular phrase to denote real property. Landed estate ordinarily means an interest
in and pertaining to lands. Real estate in general, or sometimes, by local usage, suburban or
rural land, as distinguished from real estate situated in a city."
17. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespass-
ers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182, 198 (1953).
18. Comment, Abrogation of Common Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee,
and Invitee, 25 VAND. L. REV. 623 (1972) (quoting F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS
163 (1926)).
19. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139 A. 440 (1927).
[The rule] is found to have originated in an overzealous desire to safeguard the
right of ownership as it was regarded under a system of landed estates long since
abandoned, under which the law ascribed a peculiar sanctity to rights therein.
Under the feudal system as it existed in western Europe during the Middle Ages,
the act of breaking a man's close was an invasion of exaggerated importance and
gravity.
Id. at 418, 139 A. at 442.
20. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 27.1 at 1432 (1956).
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Negligence principles emerged in common law after landowner
liability rules had developed. As a result, a fusion occurred be-
tween negligence principles and common law landowner liability
rules in which "the common law courts superimposed the new
principles upon the existing framework of entrant categories.""
This fusion resulted in the traditional common law system in
which the status of the entrant determines the duty owed by a
landowner.
In 1865, Massachusetts became the first jurisdiction to apply
the common law entrant categories in a negligence action in Swee-
ney v. Old Colony & Newport R.R.22 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court fashioned a system which classified persons entering upon a
landowner's property. The entrant's category determined the duty
imposed upon the landowner. Other American states23 followed the
Massachusetts lead, and the system which imposes a duty based on
entrant categories became the standard rule for landowner
liability.
III. CRITICISM OF THE COMMON LAW ENTRANT CATEGORIES
Continued application of the entrant categories has engendered
increasing criticism. Legal commentators argue that the entrant
categories should be abrogated in favor of a single standard.24 The
21. Comment, supra note 18, at 624.
22. 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865). In Sweeney, the plaintiff sustained two broken legs
when the defendant's railroad car collided with the plaintiff's wagon. The defendant rail-
road allowed the public to cross its property and employed a flagman to provide a signal
when crossing the tracks was safe. On the day of the accident, the defendant's flagman,
failing to notice that a train was approaching, signaled the plaintiff that he could cross. The
defendant's train collided with the plaintiff as he started across the tracks, causing the in-
jury to the plaintiff's legs. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $7500 in damages. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court reversed, stating:
No duty is imposed by law on the owner or occupant to keep his premises in a
suitable condition for those who come there solely for their own convenience or
pleasure, and who are not either expressly invited to enter or induced to come
upon them by the purpose for which the premises are appropriated and occupied,
or by some preparation or adaptation of the place for use of customers or passen-
gers, which might naturally and reasonably lead them to suppose that they might
properly and safely enter thereon.
Id. at 372-73.
23. For a listing of jurisdictions which currently apply the traditional entrant catego-
ries, see Annot., 22 A.L.R.4TH 294 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 18; Comment, Tort Liability of Owners and Pos-
sessors of Land-A Single Standard of Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances To-
wards Invitees and Licensees, 33 ARK. L. REv. 194 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tort Liabil-
ity]; Comment, The Foreseeable Emergence of the Community Standard, 51 DEN. L.J. 145
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Community Standard]; Comment, Common Law Distinctions
Between Licensee, Invitee, and Trespasser are Abolished in California and Replaced by a
Standard of Ordinary Care, 14 VILL. L. REv. 360 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Common Law
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entrant categories are deficient in a number of ways. First, the en-
trant categories are criticized as archaic and oppressive. American
jurisdictions embraced the entrant categories when America was a
sparsely populated, agrarian country. Now, however, a greater re-
gard for human safety and increasing urbanization have created
different burdens in the law. A Colorado case, Gotch v. K. & B.
Packing & Provision Co.,25 illustrates the harshness of the common
law rules when applied to a modern situation. In Gotch, a woman
fell into an unguarded elevator shaft while delivering a lunchbox to
her husband at his jobsite. The Colorado Supreme Court found the
woman to be either a trespasser or a licensee; she therefore was
required to take the premises as she found them. The court did not
find the landowner negligent and the decedent's family did not re-
ceive compensation for her death.
Despite the harsh results of cases like Gotch, courts continue
to apply the entrant categories. The notion of "hospitality" has
served as one time-honored justification. Before the prevalence of
homeowners insurance, it was considered the height of ingratitude
to sue a host for an injury sustained upon his property, because a
host would have to pay for the injury out of his own pocket.
Hospitality has also served as the justification for the guest
passenger statute, 6 which provides that a gratuitous passenger in
an automobile cannot sue the driver for injuries sustained as a re-
sult of the driver's negligence. Many jurisdictions, including Mon-
tana, have abolished their guest passenger statutes, largely because
"hospitality" is an anachronistic justification for limiting a driver's
liability. More progressive jurisdictions have held:
[W]idespread liability insurance has largely eliminated any notion
of "ingratitude" that may have once adhered to a guest's suit
against his host, and second, because the deprivation of a guest's
redress for negligence cannot rationally be justified by a desire to
promote hospitality ... there is simply no notion of ingratitude
in suing your host's insurer.27
Distinctions].
25. 93 Colo. 276, 25 P.2d 719 (1933).
26. Montana's guest passenger statute was REV. CODE. MONT. § 32-1113 (1947), which
provided:
The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for any damages or
injuries to any passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle as a guest or by
invitation and not for hire, nor for any damages to such passenger's or person's
parent or guardian, unless damages or injury is caused directly and proximately
by the grossly negligent and reckless operation by him of such motor vehicle.
The statute is now repealed. 1975 Mont. Laws Vol. 1, ch. 236.
27. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). In Brown,
the court further argued:
1986]
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If there is no ingratitude in suing a host's auto insurance carrier,
there is accordingly no notion of ingratitude involved in suing a
host's property insurer for injuries sustained as a result of the
host's negligently maintained premises.
A second criticism is that the "deceptive precision" of the en-
trant categories "produces arbitrary and inconsistent application
in borderline cases." 8 For instance, a customer who purchased a
drink in a bar was allowed to recover for a subsequent injury be-
cause, as a paying customer, he was considered an invitee.29 An-
other customer whose drink was purchased by a friend was not al-
lowed to recover for a subsequent injury because, having conferred
no benefit upon the bar, he was considered a licensee and was
therefore required to take the premises as he found them."0 In
England, an entrant was first considered a trespasser when he
came upon the land without permission, then a licensee after the
landowner had accepted his presence, then an invitee when he con-
ducted business with the landowner.31
Another criticism stems from the difficulties courts have cate-
gorizing the circumstances of modern life into rigid entrant catego-
ries. To circumvent the harshness of the categories, courts have
strained the definition of invitee to include injured licensees who
have not conferred an economic benefit upon the landowner.32 For
example, in Nary v. Parking Authority of Town of Dover,33 the
court held a public parking lot liable for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff, a passenger in a friend's automobile, when she tripped
over a cement bumper block, even though neither she nor the
driver had paid the parking fee prior to the injury.
Courts have also carved numerous exceptions to the general
A second common explanation for the hospitality justification rests on the thesis
that a guest's lawsuit against his host constitutes the epitome of "ingratitude,"
and as such ought to be condemned. As we explain below, however, this explana-
tion is unpersuasive on two separate grounds: first, because widespread liability
insurance has largely eliminated any notion of "ingratitude" that may have once
adhered to a guest's suit against his host, and second, because the deprivation of a
guest's redress for negligence cannot rationally be justified by a desire to promote
hospitality.
Id. at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
28. Comment, supra note 18, at 639.
29. Braun v. Vallade, 33 Cal. App. 279, 164 P. 904 (1917); Common Law Distinctions,
supra note 24, at 362.
30. Kneuser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 22 Cal. App. 205, 133 P. 989 (1913); Common
Law Distinctions, supra note 24, at 362.
31. Dunster v. Abott, [1953] 2 All E.R. 1572 (C.A.).
32. See, e.g., Hickey v. Shoemaker, 132 Ind. App. 136, 167 N.E.2d 487 (1960); Pope v.
Willow Garages, 274 Mass. 440, 174 N.E. 727 (1931).
33. Nary v. Parking Auth. of Town of Dover, 58 N.J. Super. 222, 156 A.2d 42 (1959).
[Vol. 47
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categories, creating even more categories and subcategories which
impose a higher standard of care upon the landowner. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts contains a lengthy catalogue of these
exceptions.3 4 Courts have avoided the licensee rule by applying the
"activities dangerous to licensees '35 and "dangerous conditions
known to possessor 36 exceptions provided by the Restatement.
The Restatement also contains six categories providing exceptions
to the trespasser rule. 37 Although the exceptions provided by the
Restatement represent a commendable effort to improve land-
owner liability law, "these changes further compounded the confu-
sion and complexity surrounding questions of landowner duty. ' 3
Despite progress in the form of judicially-created exceptions,
in many jurisdictions the most egregious deficiency in the common
law entrant categories still exists: a landowner owes a social guest a
duty merely to avoid willful and wanton conduct. Almost all juris-
dictions hold that municipalities must exercise reasonable care to
avoid exposing members of the community to an unreasonable risk
of harm.3 9 A person injured by a defect in a sidewalk would expect
compensation by the city. Yet, under the entrant categories, a so-
cial guest cannot expect his host to provide him with reasonably
safe premises. Most Americans, when dining at a neighbor's dinner
party, would be shocked to discover that their host had no obliga-
tion to warn them of unsafe surroundings.
IV. THE SINGLE STANDARD
A. Development
Under the single standard, the status of the entrant upon the
land is not solely determinative. Rather, it is but one of the factors
to be considered.4 °
The development of the single standard began in England, out
of the same system which had originally established limited land-
owner liability. In 1957, England abolished its common law entrant
categories with the passage of the Occupier's Liability Act. 1 The
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341, 342, 343,
343(B), 344 (1965).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341 (1965).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965).
37. See supra, note 34.
38. Community Standard, supra note 24, at 159.
39. In Montana, see, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 7-1-4125 (1985); Ledbetter v. City of
Great Falls, 123 Mont. 270, 213 P.2d 246 (1949); Gilligan v. City of Butte, 118 Mont. 350,
166 P.2d 797 (1946).
40. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
41. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).
19861
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Occupier's Liability Act imposes a reasonable duty of care under
the circumstances upon the occupier towards licensees and invi-
tees, while retaining the common law trespasser exception. In a
1959 decision, the United States Supreme Court applied the single
standard in the context of admiralty law in Kermarec v. Compa-
gnie Generalie,' where the plaintiff sustained injuries from a fall
down a stairway while aboard the defendant's ship. In declining to
apply the common law entrant classifications, Justice Stewart
stated:
The distinctions which the common law draws between licen-
see and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the
land, a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of
feudalism. In an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban
society, with its complex economic and individual relationships,
modern common-law courts have found it necessary to formulate
increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclassifications
among traditional common-law categories, and to delineate fine
gradations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to
each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and
subclassifications bred by the common law have produced confu-
sion and conflict. As new distinctions have been spawned, older
ones have become obscured. Through this semantic morass the
common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, towards
"imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable
care in all the circumstances."4
Although the Kermarec court expressed its approval of the
single standard, it did so only in the context of admiralty law.
Even so, Justice Stewart's criticism of the common law entrant
categories later provided the point of departure for the trend
among the states to abolish the entrant categories.
B. Rowland v. Christian
In 1968, California became the first state to adopt the single
standard in the landmark decision of Rowland v. Christian." In
Rowland, the plaintiff sustained injuries when a cracked water fau-
cet in the defendant's home broke injuring the plaintiff's hand.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
holding that the plaintiff, a social guest, could not recover as a
matter of law because a licensee must take the premises as he finds
them. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
42. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
43. Id. at 630-31.
44. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97.
[Vol. 47116
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common law entrant categories would no longer determine the
standard of care owed by a landowner, but rather a single standard
of reasonable care under all the circumstances would apply.4 5 The
Rowland court supported its decision by relying on Justice Stew-
art's reasoning in Kermarec and the rationale that the entrant cat-
egories are contrary to modern humanitarian values. The court
stated a compelling argument for abolition of the categories:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protec-
tion by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the
law because he has come upon the land of another without per-
mission or with permission but without a business purpose. Rea-
sonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending
upon such matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured
party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order to determine the
question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary to
our modern social mores and humanitarian values.
46
The Rowland court further based its decision on California
statutory law, which provides that one is responsible for injuries
caused by a failure to exercise ordinary care.47 The California Su-
preme Court found that in the absence of public policy or statu-
tory provision allowing for the common law entrant categories,
landowner liability must be governed by the fundamental tort
principles of ordinary care imposed by legislative mandate.48
Many states have followed the Rowland lead, applying a single
standard of care.49 Other states have abolished the distinction be-
tween invitee and licensee, while retaining the trespassor
category.50
45. Id. at 114, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
46. Id.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973), provides: "Every one is responsible, not only
for the results of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person .... "
48. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 114, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
49. The following states apply a single standard to all entrants. Alaska: Webb v. Sitka,
561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977); Colorado: Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489
P.2d 308 (1971); District of Columbia: Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 152 App. D.C.
86, 469 F.2d 97, cert. denied 412 U.S. 939 (1972); Hawaii: Pickard v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii
134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Louisiana: Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367
(La.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Montana: Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., - Mont.
-, 706 P.2d 491; New Hampshire: Oulette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631
(1976); New York: Barker v. Parnossa, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 926, 352 N.E.2d 880, 386 N.Y.S.2d
576 (1976); Rhode Island: Mariorenzi v. Joseph Di Ponte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127
(1975).
50. The following jurisdictions apply a single standard toward licensees and invitees,
while retaining a lesser standard of care for the trespasser category. Florida: Arias v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 426 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Maine: Poulin v. Colby
19861
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V. STATUS OF THE SINGLE STANDARD IN MONTANA
Prior to 1981, there was no question that the Montana Su-
preme Court adhered to the traditional common law entrant cate-
gories." In 1981, the Montana Supreme Court seemingly aban-
doned the common law entrant categories and adopted a single
standard of reasonable care in Corrigan v. Janney.52 In Corrigan, a
tenant died as a result of an electrical shock he received from con-
tact with the faucet of the bathtub in his apartment. The trial
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that under Montana law, a tenant "has no redress in dam-
ages for injury to person or property consequent upon the land-
lord's failure to repair."53 The Montana Supreme Court reversed,
holding that pursuant to Montana statutory law, "the owner of
premises is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the man-
agement of the premises to avoid exposing persons thereon to an
unreasonable risk of harm."54 The court in Corrigan relied on
Montana's ordinary negligence statute, which provides:
Everyone is responsible not only for the results of his willful acts
but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordi-
nary care or skill in the management of his property or person
except so far as the latter has willfully or by want of ordinary care
brought the injury upon himself.5
The Corrigan court relied extensively on Rowland in its deci-
sion. Quoting Rowland, the court held that "[T]o focus upon the
College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979); Massachusetts: Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297
N.E.2d 43 (1973); Minnesota: Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972);
North Dakota: O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977); Wisconsin: Antoniewicz v.
Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
51. See, e.g., Steen v. Grenz, 167 Mont. 279, 538 P.2d 16 (1975); Fuchs v. Huether, 154
Mont. 11, 459 P.2d 689 (1969); Blackman v. Crowe, 149 Mont. 253, 425 P.2d 323 (1967);
Lenz v. Mehrens, 149 Mont. 394, 427 P.2d 297 (1967); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 140 Mont. 59,
367 P.2d 308 (1961). See also Comment, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Use and
Occupation of Real Estate, 30 MONT. L. REV. 153 (1969).
In 1980, Justice Sheehy suggested departure from the entrant categories in a specially
concurring opinion in Rennick v. Hoover. There, he stated:
I think in a proper case we should re-examine the fiction that different rules
should apply on the duty owed to persons lawfully on another's premises, based
on their economic relationship to the possessor of the premises. In other words, I
see no reason for differentiating between invitees and licensees, because of the
economic difference in their reasons for going upon another's property ..
Rennick v. Hoover, 186 Mont. 167, 172-73, 606 P.2d 1079, 1082 (1980).
52. - Mont. -, 626 P.2d 838 (1981).
53. Id. at -, 626 P.2d at 840 (citing Busch v. Baker, 51 Mont. 326, 152 P. 750
(1915)).
54 Id. at -, 626 P.2d at 841.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-701 (1985).
[Vol. 47
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status of the injured party, . . . in order to determine the question
whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary to our mod-
ern social mores and humanitarian values.""
It appeared unquestionable that Corrigan had adopted the
single standard of reasonable care and its rationale as set out by
the California Supreme Court in Rowland. In Corrigan, the court
not only adopted the holding in Rowland, but endorsed Rowland's
interpretation that the entrant categories are contrary to the legis-
lative intent that reasonable care applies in all circumstances. The
court made no explicit mention, however, of abolishing the entrant
categories, nor did it expressly overrule its numerous prior deci-
sions which applied the common law entrant categories. The ab-
sence of specific language overruling the categories left attorneys
wondering exactly what impact Corrigan would have.
Seven months after Corrigan, Justice Haswell delivered the
court's opinion in Cereck v. Albertsons, Inc.,57 stating: "In Mon-
tana the duty imposed upon a property owner depends on the sta-
tus of the injured party."58 The plaintiff in Cereck recovered dam-
ages for an injured leg and hip due to her status as an invitee at
the defendant's premises. Even so, Justice Haswell specifically re-
lied upon the common law entrant categories in his decision with-
out reference to the court's earlier holding in Corrigan. Justice
Morrison filed a dissenting opinion in which he stated:
I concur in the result, but not in all that is said therein.
Specifically this Court has begun to depart from "status" in
determining the degree of care owed by a property owner. See
Corrigan v. Janney. The plaintiff, Mrs. Cereck, need not enjoy
the status of invitee in order to recover. A general duty of due
care is owed. 9
The majority decision in Cereck extinguished beliefs that Montana
had permanently departed from the common law entrant catego-
ries in Corrigan.
Throughout Montana, plaintiffs' attorneys argued at the trial
court level that Corrigan had changed Montana to a single stan-
dard jurisdiction, but not always with success. The Corrigan hold-
ing was too vague: it had not overruled the long line of authority
which focused on the entrant categories. The Cereck holding, how-
ever, was quite clear when it specifically held that Montana contin-
ued to focus on the entrant categories. This caused trial court
56. Corrigan, at -, 626 P.2d at 841.
57. 195 Mont. 404, 637 P.2d 509.
58. Id. at 412, 637 P.2d at 511.
59. Id. at 413-14, 637 P.2d at 512.
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judges to apply Cereck rather than Corrigan. For example, in a
1985 federal case,60 Judge Battin applied the entrant categories,
despite the plaintiff's contention that a single standard applied in
Montana. In that case, the plaintiff was a social guest at the home
of relatives. After dark, the plaintiff walked out onto the defen-
dant's second story deck. The deck had no railing around its pe-
rimeter and the plaintiff fell ten feet to the ground below, sus-
taining serious injuries.
Prior to trial, the plaintiff requested that the federal district
court certify to the Montana Supreme Court the question of
whether Montana law applied a single standard, or whether it con-
tinued to focus on the entrant categories. Judge Battin denied the
motion to certify, citing Cereck's holding that the duty imposed
depends upon the status of the injured party."1
In July, 1985, the Ninth Circuit addressed the contention that
Corrigan represented a change in Montana law in Harmon v. Bill-
ings Bench Water Association.2 When faced with the conflicting
opinions of Corrigan and Cereck, the Ninth Circuit chose to follow
Cereck and apply the entrant categories. 3 Harmon reinforced Cer-
eck's holding that Montana continued to focus on the status of the
entrant. Consequently, Montana attorneys were left to speculate
whether ideological differences among the Justices had caused the
court to vacillate, or whether the dicta in Cereck was merely a mis-
60. Davis v. Gershmel and Evans Prod., CV-84-203 (D. Mont. July 2, 1985) (order
denying motion to certify issue to state supreme court) The order stated:
The Montana Supreme Court continues to recognize that the duty imposed
upon a property owner depends upon the status of the party who had been injured
on the landowner's premises. Cereck v. Albertsons, Inc., - Mont. -, 637
P.2d 509, 511 (1981); Rennick v. Hoover, 186 Mont. 167, 170, 606 P.2d 1079, 1081
(1980). The Court chose not to abolish the distinctions, although the concurring
opinion urged abolition in both Cereck and Rennick.
The Montana Supreme Court has declined to adopt a general standard of
care for landowners when presented with the opportunity. This Court, plaintiff's
choice of forum, does not believe that certification of the question of the duty of
care owed to a social guest is proper or necessary. The law of Montana recognizes
that a property owner's duty is dependent upon the status of those who come
upon the premises.
61. Id.
62. 765 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1985).
63. In a footnote of Harmon, the Ninth Circuit Court stated:
Harmon erroneously argues that the Supreme Court of Montana no longer
focuses upon the status of an injured party in determining the duty owed by a
property owner to the injured party. In a case decided after Corrigan v. Janney,
626 P.2d 838 (Mont. 1981), upon which Harmon relies, the court stated: "In Mon-
tana, the duty imposed upon a property owner depends upon the status of the
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take. Attorneys attempting to follow the court's position on land-
owner liability were left without clear precedent.
On September 26, 1985, the Montana Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co.64 In Limber-
hand, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action on behalf of
her eighteen-month old son who drowned in an irrigation ditch in
Billings. The trial court judge granted summary judgment for the
defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. Although the Limberhand
court primarily addressed the issue of attractive nuisance and re-
manded, the court took the opportunity to address the confusion
in the area of landowner liability.
Limberhand corrected the confusion originally created by Cor-
rigan, Cerek, and Harmon. The court expressly overruled Cereck
and Harmon which applied the entrant categories. Montana now
imposes a single standard of reasonable care upon landowners in
all circumstances, pursuant to Corrigan and existing Montana stat-
utory law.65 Limberhand also expressly held that Montana's single
standard of care also applies to trespassers.
VI. THE SINGLE STANDARD IN MONTANA
Now that a single standard clearly applies in Montana, the
question becomes one of application. The Rowland and Corrigan
decisions provide guidance. The remaining text of this comment
examines the single standard of care in the context of the advan-
tages it provides, and suggests how it should be applied to a claim
alleging landowner negligence.
Under the entrant categories, cases rarely go to the jury when
they involve social guests who sustain injuries. For example, in
64. - Mont. -, 706 P.2d 491.
65. The Limberhand court stated:
In Harmon, in footnote 3, the Circuit Court of Appeals felt that this Court
had vacillated on the necessity of status of the injured party in determining the
duty owned [sic] by a property owner to an injured party. 765 F.2d at 1467. In
Corrigan v. Janney, (Mont. 1981), 626 P.2d 838, 841, 38 St.Rep.[sic] 545, 549, in
construing section 27-1-701, MCA (formerly section 58-607 R.C.M. 1947), we held
that the statute prevented us from distinguishing between social guests and invi-
tees in determining the liability of the landowner for injuries received. We regard
the same statute as declaring the applicable law as to the duty of landowners to
persons though they may be trespassers. The test is always not the status of the
injured party but the exercise of ordinary care in the circumstances by the land-
owner ...
Although in a later case, Cereck v. Albertson's, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409,
412, 637 P.2d 509, 511, we stated that the duty imposed on a property owner
depends on the status of the injured party, that statement is not correct in light of
section 27-1-701, MCA, above quoted.
Id. at -, 704 P.2d at 496.
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State ex rel. Northwest Airlines v. District Court,66 a man frac-
tured his ankle and twisted his back when he slipped (on an al-
leged oil slick) while walking from the airport terminal to a plane.
Because the man was retrieving his keys from a passenger on
board, he had conferred no benefit on the airport or the airline. As
such, he was considered a licensee. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants based upon the entrant
category rule that a licensee is required to take the premises as he
finds them.
6 7
Northwest is characteristic of the effect of the entrant catego-
ries: landowner liability cases that are summarily dismissed focus
on the issue of the entrant's status rather than whether the defen-
dant acted carelessly. Summary dismissal of entrant cases pre-
cludes jury application of their own test of reasonableness-the
touchstone of the torts process.
A. Advantages
The single standard eliminates judicial arrest of entrant cases,
like Northwest. Rather than applying rigid categories, the reasona-
bleness of the airline company's conduct would be decided by the
jury's contemporary community standards.
Application of a single standard will provide a more flexible
approach to the peculiar circumstances that may arise in each case.
Thus, a single standard of reasonable care properly focuses the is-
sue of landowner liability on the relationship between individuals
which determines duty-a relationship characterized by Professor
Prosser as one "of close proximity in time, space, direct causal se-
quence, between a negligent defendant and the person he
injures. '68
A single standard eliminates rigid categories, while imposing a
single duty in a wide range of conceivable fact situations. Under
the single standard, the basic goal of the entrant categories re-
mains intact, but is applied under a more workable standard. A
single standard of reasonable care eliminates the possibility of con-
fusing the jury with the common law categories and their attend-
ant subclassifications. It will allow jurors to determine a plaintiff's
entrant status and what weight that status should be given under
the circumstances. Lack of specific jury direction does not compro-
mise the quality of the jury's decision because "the fact that there
66. 167 Mont. 464, 539 P.2d 714 (1975).
67. Id. at 469, 539 P.2d at 717.
68. Community Standard, supra, note 24, at 160 (quoting Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited,
52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953)).
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are no definite guidelines for the jury is not unreasonable since by
their very nature the tests of foreseeability and reasonableness of
conduct defy an a priori definition.
'69
B. Application
1. Foreseeability and Policy
The entrant categories and the Restatement exceptions are no
longer solely determinative of a landowner's liability. Rather, the
threshold question is, was it reasonably foreseeable that the dan-
gerous condition existing on the landowner's premises would cause
injury to the entrant? If so, then the landowner had a duty to cor-
rect the dangerous condition or to warn the entrant of its exis-
tence. When the breach of that duty proximately causes the en-
trant's injury, the injury will be compensable regardless of whether
the injured party was an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. An attor-
ney handling this type of claim should focus on the specific factual
circumstances that will serve to establish, in the eyes of the jury, a
higher quantum of foreseeability. That quantum of foreseeability
can best be established by illuminating facts that will show:
1. the likelihood that the landowner was aware or should
have been aware of the unreasonably dangerous condition existing
upon his land;
2. the likelihood that the plaintiff would enter upon the land;
3. the likelihood that the plaintiff would encounter the dan-
gerous condition when he entered upon the land;
4. the likelihood that the plaintiff would be injured by the
dangerous condition.
In addition to these guidelines for establishing foreseeability,
the attorney may wish to utilize the following policy considerations
which the Rowland court has suggested should determine land-
owner liability.
1. Foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.
2. The degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury.
3. The closeness of connection between the defendant's con-
duct and the injury suffered.
4. The moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct.
5. The policy of preventing future harm.
6. The extent of the burden to the defendant and the conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach.
69. Tort Liability, supra note 24, at 204.
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7. The cost, availability, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved.70
2. Defenses
A single standard of reasonable care, applied to social guests
as well may seem inequitable to landowners. However, the single
standard does not leave landowners utterly bereft of protection
from liability, nor does it dictate that landowners will be "absolute
liability carriers for all who come upon the land. ' 71 Under a single
standard of care, there remains no duty to warn where it would be
reasonable to expect that an ordinary person would observe the
danger. Thus, the plaintiff's culpability remains accounted for
under the comparative fault system.
Montana has stepped further than most jurisdictions in hold-
ing that the standard of reasonable care applies to trespassers.
Many would suggest that this in effect creates unlimited liability
upon a landowner. However, it will remain very difficult to con-
vince a jury that one who entered upon the landowner's premises
without permission should receive compensation for an injury. The
plaintiff's attorney who handles a trespasser's claim will want to
establish facts showing that even though the trespasser was upon
the land without permission, it was nevertheless reasonably fore-
seeable that he would enter upon the land and sustain injuries
from contact with the dangerous condition. Conversely, the defense
attorney will want to establish facts that will show a jury that the
entrant's presence was unforeseeable and that it would be unfair to
impose a duty upon the landowner. This should remain an effec-
tive defense to claim's by trespassers.
VII. CONCLUSION
With faltering steps, the Montana Supreme Court has brought
Montana's landowner liability law out of the past and constructed
a framework more consistent with the realities of modern society.
The single standard is also far more consistent with fundamental
tort principles of reasonableness and foreseeability. Due to its
vague language and absence of discussion overruling the entrant
categories, few were positive that Corrigan had changed Montana
to a single standard jurisdiction. After four years, the supreme
court has finally corrected its mistake in Cereck. Montana has
70. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at - , 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
71. Tort Liability, supra note 24, at 201.
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joined a number of other progressive states in becoming a single
standard jurisdiction.
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